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THE ARBITRATION OF A PUBLIC
SECURITIES DISPUTE
CONSTANTINE N. KA TSORIS*
INTRODUCTION
N the United States, the status of the economy is measured daily on
the basis of its financial markets. This appraisal is reflected and re-
ported with great fanfare by the media. Almost everyone has an opinion
about the market, and for many-after a glimpse at the headlines-the
financial section is their first stop in perusing the morning newspaper.
The market's performance controls investment and political decisions at
every level of our society. In short, the struggle between the "bulls" and
the "bears" is more than just a national pastime.
Increasingly, the public is using these security markets as investment
vehicles to achieve total return directly through income and capital
gain,1 or indirectly through Individual Retirement Accounts,2 Keogh
plans and other pension devices.3 In addition, the array of investment
vehicles available to the public has been constantly expanding.4 This
broader public involvement in financial markets has led to increased liti-
gation between the public and members of the securities industry.5
Last year these litigations numbered in the thousands.6 With greater
frequency, however, these disputes are being channelled into arbitration
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law, B.S. 1953, Fordhan Uni-
versity; J.D. 1957, Fordhan University School of Law; LL.M. 1963, New York Univer-
sity School of Law; Public Member of Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration
since its inception in 1977; Public Member of National Arbitration Committee of the
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), 1975-1981; Public Arbitrator at New
York Stock Exchange since 1971; Public Arbitrator at NASD since 1968; Arbitrator for
First Judicial Department in New York since 1972.
1. Net capital gains are taxed at a maximum federal tax rate of 20%. See I.R.C.
§ 1202(a) (1982) (60% deduction for capital gains); I.R.C. § I (Supp. 1984) (for all cate-
gories maximum tax rate is 50%). Recently the long term holding period has been low-
ered to six months from one year. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369,
§ 1001(a), 98 Stat. 494, 1011, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1011 (to be
codified at I.R.C. § 1222).
2. See I.R.C. § 219 (West Supp. 1984).
3. See I.R.C. §§ 401(c), 404, 415(b),(c) (West Supp. 1984).
4. See Maidenberg, Futures/Options, Young Markets Play Key Role, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 6, 1984, at D6, col. 3 (increased use of index and option markets enables institu-
tional investors to transfer huge cash reserves into stock market).
5. See Statistical Analysis and Reports Division, Administrative Office of U.S.
Courts, Federal Judicial Workload Statistics A-9 (March 31, 1984) (during twelve-month
period ended March 31, 1984, over 3,000 securities and commodities exchange civil ac-
tions were filed in federal district courts) [hereinafter cited as Statistical Report]; see also
Stem, Malpractice for Brokers, Forbes, March 26, 1984, at 38 ("[T]here is a growing,
generally unpublicized number of suits against brokerage firms involving oil and gas
shelters.").
6. See Statistical Report, supra note 5, at A-9.
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before forums established by the various Security Regulatory Organiza-
tions (SROs) such as the New York Stock Exchange and the National
Association of Securities Dealers.7 Arbitration provides the advantage of
speedy dispute resolution by persons knowledgeable in the area, without
7. See Fourth Report of the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration Statisti-
cal Report (Nov. 1984) Exhibit A - (available in files of Fordham Law Review) [herein-
after cited as Fourth Report]. The SROs include the following members: American
Stock Exch.; Boston Stock Exch.; Chicago Bd. Options Exch.; Cincinnati Stock Exch.;
Midwest Stock Exch.; Municipal Sec. Rulemaking Bd.; National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers,
Inc.; New York Stock Exch.; Pacific Stock Exch.; and Philadelphia Stock Exch. Id. at 12.
The bulk of said arbitrations are handled before the National Association of Securities
Dealers and the New York Stock Exchange. Id. at Exhibit A- Statistical Report. The
following is a breakdown of the arbitrations handled by the arbitration facilities of the
various SROs:
COMPOSITE FIGURES
Total
Cases
Received
830
1,042
1,340
1,731
Total
Cases
Concluded
Including
Settlements
686
980
1,044
1,259
Small
Claims
Received
332
306
322
416
Small
Claims
Concluded
269
357
292
320
Public
Customer
Cases
Decided
410
532
558
622
Awards
in Favor
of Public
205
264
293
331
AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE, INC.
Total
Cases
Received
Total
Cases
Concluded
Including
Settlements
Small
Claims
Received
18
7
9
14
Small
Claims
Concluded
11
I1
4
8
Public
Customer
Cases
Decided
35
42
16
10
Awards
in Favor
of Public
16
22
10
6
Cases pending as of January 1, 1984: 50
THE BOSTON STOCK EXCHANGE
Total
Cases
Received
Total
Cases
Concluded
Including
Settlements
Small
Claims
Received
2
2
1
2
Small
Claims
Concluded
2
2
1
2
Cases carried over into 1984: 0
Public
Customer
Cases
Decided
2
0
1
2
Awards
in Favor
of Public
0
0
1
1
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CHICAGO BOARD OPTIONS EXCHANGE
Total
Cases
Received
Total
Cases
Concluded
Including
Settlements
Small
Claims
Received
45 5
Small
Claims
Concluded
11
8
6
Public
Customer
Cases
Decided
18
12
14
13
Awards
in Favor
of Public
6
3
3
6
Cases carried over into 1984: 16
THE CINCINNATI STOCK EXCHANGE
Total
Cases
Received
Total
Cases
Concluded
Including
Settlements
Small
Claims
Received
0
0
0
0
Small
Claims
Concluded
0
0
0
0
Public
Customer
Cases
Decided
0
0
0
0
Awards
in Favor
of Public
0
0
0
0
Cases pending as of January 1, 1984: 0
MIDWEST STOCK EXCHANGE, INC.
Total
Cases
Received
Total
Cases
Concluded
Including
Settlements
Small
Claims
Received
I
0
0
0
Small
Claims
Concluded
0
0
0
0
Cases pending as of January 1, 1984: 1
MUNICIPAL SECURITIES RULEMAKING BOARD
Total
Cases
Received
Total
Cases
Concluded
Including
Settlements
Small
Claims
Received
21 7
Small
Claims
Concluded
7
Cases pending as of January 1, 1984: 52
Public
Customer
Cases
Decided
0
0
0
0
Awards
in Favor
of Public
1
0
0
0
1980
1981
1982
1983
Public
Customer
Cases
Decided
3
7
13
Awards
in Favor
of Public
2
4
6
5
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC.
Total
Cases Public
Total Concluded Small Small Customer Awards
Cases Including Claims Claims Cases in Favor
Received Settlements Received Concluded Decided of Public
1980 318 234 134 113 122 56
1981 422 422 142 177 242 118
1982 606 435 157 139 276 140
1983 768 549 216 147 272 161
Cases pending as of January 1, 1984: 654
NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE
Total
Cases Public
Total Concluded Small Small Customer Awards
Cases Including Claims Claims Cases in Favor
Received Settlements Received Concluded Decided of Public
1980 367 327 131 110 221 119
1981 477 433 117 134 214 111
1982 558 473 109 113 214 118
1983 713 532 136 122 276 137
Cases pending as of January 1, 1984: 486
THE PACIFIC STOCK EXCHANGE, INCORPORATED
Total
Cases Public
Total Concluded Small Small Customer Awards
Cases Including Claims Claims Cases in Favor
Received Settlements Received Concluded Decided of Public
1980 24 28 12 11 4 3
1981 24 20 17 17 9 5
1982 31 21 15 11 10 7
1983 35 29 17 17 23 10
Cases carried over into 1984: 20
PHILADELPHIA STOCK EXCHANGE
Total
Cases Public
Total Concluded Small Small Customer Awards
Cases Including Claims Claims Cases in Favor
Received Settlements Received Concluded Decided of Public
1980 7 0 16 4 4 2
1981 10 6 6 3 6 1
1982 23 15 18 11 14 8
1983 17 19 9 11 12 5
Cases carried over into 1984: 6
Id.
Preliminary figures for 1984 indicate a significant aggregate increase over the previous
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excessive costs. 8 Unless arbitration procedures are fair in fact and ap-
pearance, however, their present popularity as a means of resolving se-
curities disputes will be greatly diminished.
This Article discusses the history and development of securities arbi-
tration, the availability of arbitration, the enforceability of arbitration
agreements, and some jurisdictional and procedural problems inherent in
present practices. The Article concludes that the arbitration process must
become more centralized and independent, and must include more direct
public participation.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITIES ARBITRATION
Prior to 1976, most SROs had differing rules for the administration of
securities arbitration disputes. In June 1976, the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC or Commission) solicited comments from in-
terested persons on the feasibility of developing a "uniform system of
dispute grievance procedures for the adjudication of small claims." 9 Af-
ter conducting a public forum at which written and oral comments were
received, the SEC's Office of Consumer Affairs issued a report recom-
mending the adoption of procedures for handling investor disputes and
the creation of a new entity to administer the system.' 0
Before implementing the proposal for a new arbitration forum, the
Commission invited further public comment." In response to this invi-
tation, several SROs proposed that a securities industry task force be
established to consider the development of "a uniform arbitration code
and the means for establishing a more efficient, economic and appropri-
ate mechanism for resolving investor disputes involving small sums of
money." 12 Pursuant to such suggestion, a Securities Industry Confer-
ence on Arbitration (SICA), consisting of representatives of various
SROs,13 the Securities Industry Association (SIA)'4 and the public,"5
year in the number of security arbitrations filed with the SROs. Dorfman, A Lynch Mob
from Maryland is after Merrill, N.Y. Sunday News, Oct. 14, 1984, at 51, col. 1. ("On the
Big Board, as well as the National Association of Securities Dealers ... the number of
arbitration filings this year is each up a hefty 41%.").
8. See infra notes 36-52, and accompanying text.
9. See. Exch. Act Release No. 12528 (June 9, 1976), reprinted in 9 SEC Docket 833-
35 (March-July 1976).
10. See. Exch. Act Release No. 12974 (Nov. 15, 1976), reprinted in 10 SEC Docket
955-56 (July-Dec. 1976).
11. Id
12. Fourth Report, supra note 7, at 1.
13. The following SROs were represented: the American, Boston, Cincinnati, Mid-
west, New York, Pacific and Philadelphia Stock Exchanges, the Chicago Board Options
Exchange, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board and the National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. Id. at 2.
14. Id. The SIA is a trade association for the securities industry.
15. Peter R. Celia, Jr., Esq., Mortimer Goodman, Esq., and the author have served as
Public Members of SICA since its creation in 1977. Id. In 1983, Justin Klein, Esq. was
added as the fourth Public Member of SICA. Id.
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was established in April 1977.16
The Commission then invited proposals from SICA to address, inter
alia, improved methods for the resolution of investors' small claims. 7
After holding numerous meetings throughout the country, SICA devel-
oped a simplified arbitration procedure for resolving customer claims of
$2,500 or less,18 and issued an informational booklet describing small
claims procedures (Small Claims Booklet).19 Realizing, however, that
the development of a small claims procedure was only a first step,
20
SICA then developed a comprehensive Uniform Code of Arbitration
(Uniform Code of Arbitration or Code)" for the securities industry. The
Code established a uniform system of arbitration procedures to cover all
claims by investors. 22 In addition, SICA prepared an explanatory book-
let for prospective claimants (Procedures Booklet or Arbitration Proce-
dures) 23 explaining procedures under the Code. To a great extent, the
Code incorporated and harmonized the rules of the various SROs and
codified various procedures which the SROs had followed but which
were not included in their existing rules. The Code was adopted by the
participating SROs during 1979 and 1980.24 Since then, various revi-
sions have been made to both the Code and the Procedures Booklet, 25
and SICA has continued "to meet periodically to monitor the perform-
ance of the Code in action". 26 To date, almost five thousand cases-
including small claims-have been filed with the participating SROs
since the approval of the Code.27
16. Id. at 1-2.
17. Implementation of An Investor Dispute System, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,136, at 87,905 (April 26, 1977) (Sec. Exch. Act Release No.
13470) [hereinafter cited as Investor Dispute System].
18. Fourth Report, supra note 7, at 2.
19. See Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration, How to Proceed with the Ar-
bitration of a Small Claim (available in files of Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter cited as
Small Claims Booklet].
20. Report of the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration to the Securities and
Exchange Commission 7-8 (Nov. 15, 1977 ) (available in files of Fordham Law Review)
[hereinafter cited as First Report].
21. See Uniform Code of Arbitration (as amended), reprinted in Fourth Report of the
Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration to the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (Nov. 1984) (Exhibit C) (available in files of Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter cited
as Uniform Code of Arbitration]. The Small Claims procedure was incorporated into
section 2 of the Code. Uniform Code of Arbitration, supra, § 2.
22. Fourth Report, supra note 7, at 2.
23. See Third Report of the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration to the
Securites and Exchange Commission 5 (Jan. 31, 1980) (available in files of Fordham Law
Review) [hereinafter cited as Third Report]; Securities Industry Conference on Arbitra-
tion, Arbitration Procedures (1980) (available in files of Fordham Law Review) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Procedures Booklet].
24. Fourth Report, supra note 7, at 3.
25. For examples of such amendments, see infra notes 41, 59, 64, 252 and accompa-
nying text.
26. Fourth Report, supra note 7, at 3. Whether SICA will continue to perform that
role in the future is an open question. See infra Conclusion.
27. See Fourth Report, supra note 7, at Exhibit A- Statistical Report.
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II. AVAILABILITY OF ARBITRATION
A. General Procedures Under The Uniform Code of Arbitration
The Code establishes a uniform system of arbitration procedures to be
used throughout the securities industry for all claims regardless of the
dollar amount in question.2" It "provides for [the] arbitration of disputes
between customers and securities industry organizations and individuals
under the auspices of the participating [SRO] selected by the cus-
tomer.""u Such submission is generally initiated pursuant to a duly exe-
cuted and enforceable written agreement 0 or upon demand by the
customer.3' Under the Code, however, the SROs have reserved the right
to decline the use of their arbitration facilities "where-having due re-
gard for the purposes of the [relevant SRO] and the intent of [the]
Code-such dispute, claim or controversy is not a proper subject matter
for arbitration."32 Thus, the arbitration facilities of the participating
SROs are generally available only for the "resolution of disputes relating
to or arising out of the activities of broker-dealers." 33 Moreover, a con-
troversy is not eligible for submission to arbitration if six or more years'
have elapsed from the date of the event giving rise to the dispute.3"
The Code also directs the SRO to appoint a panel of not less than
three, nor more than five, impartial arbitrators,36 at least a majority of
whom shall not be from the securities industry. 37 The public customer
may, however, request a panel consisting of at least a majority from the
securities industry.38 In addition, the Director of Arbitration of the SRO
shall determine the individuals who shall serve on a particular arbitration
28. See infra notes 63-78 and accompanying text for a description of small claims
procedures under the Code.
29. Third Report, supra note 23, at 3.
30. Uniform Code of Arbitration, supra note 21, § 1(a). See infra note 54 and accom-
panying text.
31. Uniform Code of Arbitration, supra note 21, § 1(a).
32. Id. § 1(b). For example, an SRO can decline to accept for arbitration a personal
injury claim totally unrelated to the securities business.
33. Procedures Booklet, supra note 23, at 2.
34. Uniform Code of Arbitration, supra note 21, § 4. This six year period may be
extended, however, by the tolling provision of the Code, which provides:
Where permitted by law, the time limitation(s) which would otherwise run or
accrue for the institution of legal proceedings, shall be tolled when a duly exe-
cuted Submission Agreement is filed by the Claimant(s). The tolling shall con-
tinue for such period as the [SRO] shall retain jurisdiction upon the matter
submitted.
Id. § 7(a).
35. Id. § 4. See generally Annot., 94 A.L.R. 3d 533 (1979) (discussing how statutes of
limitation can bar arbitration).
36. Uniform Code of Arbitration, supra note 21, § 8(a)(1). If the matter in contro-
versy is $100,000 or more, a panel of five arbitrators is mandatory. Id. § 8(a)(2); see id.
§ 11. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
37. Uniform Code of Arbitration, supra note 21, § 8(a)(l), (2). For a discussion of
who such nonindustry arbitrators may be, see infra notes 245-55 and accompanying text.
38. Uniform Code of Arbitration, supra note 21, § 8(a)(1), (2).
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panel and may name the chairperson of each panel.39 The Code further
provides that the parties must be informed of the names and affiliations
of the arbitrators before the date fixed for the initial hearing.40 Each
party is given one peremptory challenge, 4' although challenges for cause
are unlimited. 42 Furthermore, to ensure that the parties can make an
informed decision as to the neutrality of the arbitrators, the arbitrators
are affirmatively obligated to disclose "any circumstances which might
preclude such arbitrator from rendering an objective and impartial deter-
mination."43 Consistent with arbitration practice generally, 41 the Code
gives wide latitude to arbitrators concerning the materiality, relevance
and admissibility of evidence.45 At any stage of the proceeding, all par-
ties have the right to representation by counsel. 46 The Code does not
require the SRO's to keep a record of the arbitration proceeding, how-
ever, unless requested by the arbitrator or a party.4 7
Although the Code further provides that the arbitrators and counsel
shall have subpoena power as provided by law, 48 it encourages the parties
to produce the necessary documents and witnesses "to the fullest extent
possible without resort to the issuance of the subpoena process.",49 More-
over, arbitrators can compel the appearance of any employee or associate
of any member or member organization of the SRO conducting the arbi-
tration, "and/or the production of any records in the possession or con-
trol of such persons, members or member organizations."5 The Code
also provides that the "parties shall cooperate in the voluntary exchange
of such documents and information"'" as will serve to expedite the arbi-
39. Id. § 8(b). Some SROs permit the arbitrators to pick the chairperson of their
panel. Id.
40. Id. § 9 ("The Director of Arbitration [of the SRO] shall inform the parties of the
names and business affiliations of the arbitrators at least eight business days prior to the
date fixed for the initial hearing session.").
41. Id. § 10. Moreover, SICA has amended the Code so that when there are multiple
claimants, respondents and/or third party respondents, there shall be only one peremp-
tory challenge "unless the Director of Arbitration determines that the interests of justice
would best be served by awarding additional peremptory challenges." Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. § 11.
44. See Domke, On Commercial Arbitration § 24.02, at 364 (1984) (arbitrators have
discretionary power to admit and hear any evidence parties may wish to present, and
rulings on admissibility of evidence are not reviewable by courts).
45. Uniform Code of Arbitration, supra note 21, § 22.
46. Id. § 15.
47. Id. § 25. In fact, however, some sort of record is kept by most SROs. If a party
asks to have the record transcribed, he must bear the cost. Id.
48. Id. § 20(a); see, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-1507 (1982); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code
§ 1282.6 (West 1982 & Supp. 1984); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-412 (1982 & Supp. 1984);
New York Civ. Prac. Law § 7505 (McKinney 1980). For a discussion of the effect of such
subpoenas see infra note 52.
49. Uniform Code of Arbitration, supra note 21, § 20(a).
50. Id. § 21. "Unless the arbitrators direct otherwise, the party requesting the appear-
ance of a person or the production of documents . . . shall bear all reasonable costs of
such appearance and/or production." Id.
51. Id. § 20(b).
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tration. Extensive pre-trial discovery as practiced in the courts, however,
is not available in arbitration proceedings.5 2
52. Domke, supra note 44, § 27.01 at 411. Generally, pre-trial discovery procedures,
such as bills of particulars, interrogatories, depositions, and notices to produce docu-
ments for inspection, "are intended to eliminate 'trial by ambush'-to focus the dispute
by bringing to light the pertinent differences before trial." Goldstein, Issue of Pretrial
Discovery, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1979, at D4, col. 1; see Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Miller,
402 F.2d 134, 143 (8th Cir. 1968); Wood v. Todd Shipyards, 45 F.R.D. 363, 364 (S.D.
Tex. 1968); Ash v. Farwell, 37 F.R.D. 553, 556 (D. Kan. 1965). Regrettably, however,
discovery can be unnecessarily expensive and burdensome, Committee on Arbitration,
Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., The Use of Discovery in Arbitration 231, 232 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as The Use of Discovery in Arbitration]; Ehrenbod, Cutting Costs
Through Interrogatories and Document Requests, 1 Litigation 17, 17 (Spring 1975);
Limoni, The Quantum of Discovery v. the Quality of Justice: More is Less, 4 Litigation 8, 8
(Fall 1977), at times running on for years and involving millions of documents. Gold-
stein, supra, at D4, col. 1; see Federal Judicial Center, Survey of Literature on Discovery
from 1970 to the Present: Expressed Dissatisfactions and Proposed Reform 49 (1978).
See generally Pope, Rule 34: Controlling the Paper Avalanche, 7 Litigation 28, 28 (Spring
1981) (analysis of cases involving extensive discovery). In short, discovery can "become a
stalling tactic, a nuisance, an effort to grind down the other side." Goldstein, supra, at
D4, col. 1; see Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 521, 523
(1980) (Powell, J., dissenting); Rosenberg, Discovery Abuse, 7 Litigation 8, 8 (Spring
1981).
For these reasons, it is not much of a surprise that in most jurisdictions pre-trial dis-
covery is much more limited in an arbitration than in an action at law. Goldberg, A
Lawyer's Guide to Commercial Arbitration § 3.03, at 40 (2d ed. 1983). This is true "even
though the lack of discovery may be fatal to a party's case." Id. The rationale supporting
the policy of limited discovery is that the "purpose of and methods of procedures in
arbitration are to achieve an economical, expedited and fair result . . . . Indeed, the
desire to contain costs and avoid delay are usually the major reasons why parties elect
and agree to arbitrate disputes." The Use of Discovery in Arbitration, supra, at 232; see
Goldberg, A Supreme Court Justice Looks at Arbitration, 20 Arb. J. 13, 14 (1965); Wil-
lenken, Discovery in Aid of Arbitration, 6 Litigation 16, 16 (Vinter 1980). In addition,
arbitrators may be laymen unfamiliar with disclosure proceedings and therefore may be
unable to prevent abuse and exercise adequate control. 8 J. Weinstein, H. Korn & A.
Miller, New York Civil Practice 7505.06, at 75-129 (1984); see Wolff, Disclosure Pro-
ceedings Oppossed, 18 Bar. Bull. 111, 111 (Nov.-Dec. 1960).
In arbitrations, discovery is usually limited to a voluntary disclosure of evidence by the
parties and a mandatory disclosure of evidence by subpoena issued by the arbitrators or,
in some instances, the attorney of record. The Use of Discovery in Arbitration, supra, at
232. The state statutes that grant arbitrators subpoena power, see supra note 48, do not
confer on the abitrator the authority to use discovery devices. 8 J. Weinstein, H. Korn &
A. Miller, supra, 7505.06, at 75-128. Rather, the statutes merely permit the arbitrator to
issue a subpoena ordering the parties to produce evidence at the arbitration hearing itself
"in order to relieve [the arbitrator] of the necessity of asking a court to issue the sub-
poena." Id. 7505.06, at 75-129. Generally, however, counsels for the parties can agree
on a procedure for reviewing the subpoenaed documents in advance of the hearing,
thereby saving the time of both the parties and the arbitrators at the hearing. The Use of
Discovery in Arbitration, supra, at 235; see Uniform Code of Arbitration, supra note 21,
§ 20. More intensive pre-arbitration discovery may be permissible if the parties so provide
by agreement, R. Haydock & D. Herr, Discovery Practice § 10.3.2, at 487 (1982); Wil-
lenken, supra, at 18, or if the "rules under which the arbitration is conducted permit the
arbitrators to settle the procedures which govern." The Use of Discovery in Arbitration,
supra, at 232.
Although a court may have the power to permit pre-arbitration discovery, R. Haydock
& D. Herr, supra, § 10.3.2, at 488; Willenken, supra, at 16; Willenken, The Often Over-
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The Code also sets out provisions for pleadings and amendments
thereto. 3 A claimant institutes a proceeding by filing three executed
copies of both the Submission Agreement and the Statement of Claim of
the controversy in dispute.54 The Statement of Claim should specify the
relevant facts and remedies sought.55 The respondent has twenty busi-
ness days from receipt to submit an executed copy of the Submission
Agreement and a copy of his Answer,56 which must set forth all available
defenses to the Statement of Claim. 7
Although this procedure may seem adequate on its face, problems
have occasionally occurred in practice when the Answer has consisted
solely of a general denial. In such a situation, the claimant, stripped of
the normal discovery procedures available in judicial litigation,58 may be
looked Use of Discovery in Aid of Arbitration and the Spread of the New York Rule to
Federal Common Law, 35 Bus. Law 173, 173-74 (Nov. 1979), this power has been used
sparingly and only in extreme circumstances. R. Haydock & D. Herr, supra, § 10.3.2, at
488; 8 J. Weinstein, H. Kom & A. Miller, supra, 7505.06, at 75-130; Note, Arbitration
and Award-Discovery-Court May Permit Discovery on the Merits When It Will Not Delay
Arbitration, 44 Cinn. L. Rev. 151, 152 (1975). Indeed, the New York Court of Appeals in
DeSapio v. Kohlmeyer, 35 N.Y.2d 402, 321 N.E.2d 770, 362 N.Y.S.2d 843 (1974), held
that a defendant had waived his right to arbitration as provided in the agreement because
he had procured a pre-trial deposition of the plaintiff in a judicial action. Id. at 406, 321
N.E.2d at 773, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 847. The court stated that the procurement of the plain-
tiff's deposition constituted "an election between the forums available for the resolution
of the dispute." Id.
Some commentators have proposed that arbitrators have the discretion to:
direct that documents called for by subpoena be made available for review by
the adverse party in advance of a hearing. In the event that the subpoenaed
party objects to the scope of the subpoena or the production of any of the docu-
ments called for, the Arbitrator shall rule on such objection prior to directing
that the documents be made available for review.
The Use of Discovery in Arbitration, supra, at 231. The commentators maintain that
such a proposal will help save the time of the parties and the arbitrators and will help
avoid those situations where the parties cannot agree on pre-hearing document inspec-
tion. Id. at 235. SICA, however, rejected a similar suggestion because of the potential for
abuses causing excessive costs and delays. Instead, § 20 of the Code simply provides:
(a) The arbitrators and any counsel of record to the proceedings shall have the
power of the subpoena process as provided by law. However, the parties shall
produce witnesses and present proofs to the fullest extent possible without re-
sort to the issuance of the subpoena process.
(b) Prior to the first hearing session, the parties shall cooperate in the voluntary
exchange of such documents and information as will serve to expedite the arbi-
tration. If the parties agree, they may also submit additional documents to the
Director of Arbitration for forwarding to the arbitrators.
Uniform Code of Arbitration, supra note 21, § 20.
53. Uniform Code of Arbitration, supra note 21, §§ 13(a) & (b), 27. Section 13 of the
Code also sets forth a provision for joinder and consolidation. Id. § 13(c).
54. Id. § 13(a). The Submission Agreement is a document filed with the SRO
whereby the parties agree to submit their controversy to arbitration. See First Report,
supra note 20, at Exhibit B for an illustration of a Submission Agreement.
55. Uniform Code of Arbitration, supra note 21, § 13(a).
56. Id. § 13(b).
57. Id.
58. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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unaware of the respondent's defenses and consequently may be unsure of
what he must prove at the hearing. To avoid this situation, SICA re-
cently approved an amendment to the Code59 that requires the defendant
to specify in his answer all available defenses and relevant facts on which
he will rely at the hearing." In addition, if the defendant pleads a gen-
eral denial and the claimant makes a written objection to the Director of
Arbitration prior to the hearing, the arbitrators may bar the defendant
from presenting any facts or defenses at the hearing.6' Finally, if the
"defendant fails to specify all available defenses and relevant facts in [his]
answer. . . [the defendant] may, upon objection by the [claimant]...
be barred from presenting the facts or defenses not included in such
party's answer at the hearing."62
B. Small Claims Procedure
The provisions governing Small Claims are found in section 2 of the
Code.63 Under that section, customer disputes involving $2,500 or less'
"shall, upon demand of the customer(s) or by written consent of the
parties"65 be submitted for resolution to a single arbitrator" who is
59. The amendment was passed after much debate within SICA. Some members
maintained that respondents who had used general denials to gain a tactical pleading
advantage could be adequately controlled under the arbitrators' already broad powers to
discipline abusive parties. SICA concluded, however, that more specific guidance was
needed to solve the problem.
60. The revised section provides:
(b) Answer-Defenses, Counterclaims and/or Crossclaims
(1) The Respondent(s) shall within twenty (20) business days from receipt of
service file with the Director of Arbitration one (1) executed Submission Agree-
ment and one (1) copy of the Respondent's(s') Answer. The Answer shall spec-
ify all available defenses and relevant facts that will be relied upon at hearing
and [may set forth any related counterclaim the Respondent] may have against
the Claimant and any third party claim against any other party or person upon
any existing dispute, claim or controversy to arbitration under this Code.
Fourth Report, supra note 7, at C-5 (Uniform Code of Arbitration § 13(b)(1))
61. The Code further provides:
(2) (i) A Respondent, Responding Claimant, Cross-Claimant or Third Party
Respondent who pleads only a general denial as an answer may, upon written
objection by the adversary party before the hearing to the Director of Arbitra-
tion, in the discretion of the arbitrators, be barred from presenting any facts or
defenses at the time of the hearing.
Uniform Code of Arbitration, supra note 21, § 13(b)(2)(1).
62. Id.
63. Uniform Code of Arbitration, supra note 21, § 2.
64. Id. § 2(a). The ceiling for Small Claims disputes has been raised to $5,000. See
Fourth Report, supra note 7, at 3. The Revisions to the Code have already been filed or
will be filed shortly by the various SROs with the SEC Id.
65. Uniform Code of Arbitration, supra note 21, § 2(a).
66. Id. § 2(f). Upon the request of the single arbitrator, the SRO can appoint two
additional arbitrators to the panel to decide the matter in controversy, id. § 2(1), in which
case the majority will be public arbitrators, id. § 2 G).
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knowledgeable in the securities industry.67 "The arbitrator will decide
the dispute on the basis of the documents submitted, unless the customer
requests a hearing and the arbitrator believes that a hearing is necessary
or appropriate."68 If a hearing is to be held, the Arbitration Director of
the SRO with which the claim has been filed will choose the location,69
giving due consideration to the residence of the claimant and other rele-
vant factors.7 ° Unless otherwise provided, the general arbitration rules7
of the SRO involved will be followed at the Small Claims proceeding.
7 2
In addition, "certain matters of an internal administrative nature [are
left] to the discretion of the sponsoring SRO."7 3
The Small Claims procedure was designed to provide a fair, easy and
inexpensive arbitration system. It allows a public customer to initiate a
proceeding by filing a simple explanation of the basis of the claim,74 and
by paying a small fee as a deposit for costs.75 The deposit is refunded if
the matter is resolved without the use of an arbitrator.76 Otherwise the
refund of the deposit is within the arbitrator's discretion.77 Since the
inception of the Small Claims procedure, nearly 1500 small claims have
been filed with the participating SROs.7 8
C. Finality of the Award
The scope of judicial review of an arbitration award is very limited.79
"If the award is within the submission, and contains the honest decision
of the arbitrators, after a full and fair hearing of the parties, a court of
equity will not set it aside for error, either in law or fact."8 In fact, the
typical grounds for vacating an arbitration award are surprisingly uni-
form throughout the United States,81 namely:
(1) There was an undisclosed relationship between an arbitrator
67. Id. § 2(f). "In appointing ... such person reasonable efforts will be made to
select an arbitrator from the public sector." First Report, supra note 20, at 4.
68. Uniform Code of Arbitration, supra note 21, § 2(0; First Report, supra note 20, at
4.
69. Uniform Code of Arbitration, supra note 21, § 2(f).
70. First Report, supra note 20, at 5.
71. See supra notes 28-62 and accompanying text.
72. Uniform Code of Arbitration, supra note 21, § 2().
73. First Report, supra note 20, at 7.
74. Id. at 5.
75. Uniform Code of Arbitration, supra note 21, § 2(c). The present fee is $15. Id.
With the increase in the jurisdictional limit of Small Claims from $2,500 to $5,000, how-
ever, see supra note 64, that fee will rise to $25 if the controversy is more than $1,000, but
less than $2,500, and $100 if the controversy is worth more than $2,500 but less than
$5,000. Fourth Report, supra note 7, at 3.
76. See Small Claims Booklet, supra note 19, at 3.
77. See Uniform Code of Arbitration, supra note 21, § 2(c).
78. Fourth Report, supra note 7, at Exhibit A-Statistical Report.
79. Goldberg, supra note 52, § 5.03, at 61; see Domke, supra note 44, § 33.02, at 465-
67.
80. Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349 (1854).
81. Goldberg, supra note 52, § 5.04, at 62.
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and a party or his counsel affecting the arbitrator's impartiality or ap-
pearance of impartiality.
(2) An arbitrator was corrupt.
(3) The arbitrators did not schedule or conduct the hearing in a
fair and judicious manner.
(4) The arbitrators granted relief that they were not authorized to
grant under the contract pursuant to which the arbitration was held. 82
Although SICA did consider broadening the scope of review of securities
arbitration awards,83 the proposal was rejected as inimical to the simplic-
ity and brevity of arbitration procedures.
84
82. Id. at § 5.04 at 63; see Annot. 22 A.L.R. 4th 366 (1983). When an arbitration
involves a dispute arising from an interstate commerce transaction, it is governed by § 10
of the United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1982), which provides:
In either of the following cases the United States court in and for the district
wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the
application of any party to the arbitration-
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either
of them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent
and material to the controversy; or of any misbehavior by which the rights of
any party have been prejudiced.
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted
was not made.
(e) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement re-
quired the award to be made has not expired, the court may, in its discretion,
direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.
9 U.S.C. § 10 (1982).
83. See Minority Report of Mortimer Goodman, Public Member Security Industry
Conference on Arbitration, In Respect of a Right of Review of an Arbitrarion Award
(Filed with SEC on Dec. 15, 1977) (available in files of Fordham Law Review). Under
this proposal, any party to an arbitration would have the right to seek review of the
award before a newly appointed three member Review Panel of Arbitrators. Id. at Ex-
hibit A. The costs of the arbitration would be assessed against the party moving for
review, unless the Review Panel reversed the award and sent it back for a new hearing or
modified it. Id. at 3. A system of alternative dispute resolution in New York similarly
provides that a litigant, after disposition of a case, "may seek a court trial de noo...
[and] unless he receives a more favorable result on the trial, he shall pay costs to the other
party." Greenwald, Alternatives to Court Resolution of Dispute: Report of NASBA's Spe-
cial Committee, N.Y.S.B. J., Oct. 1984, at 36-37 (footnote omitted).
84. Broadening the scope of arbitration review would undoubtedly result in increased
expenses, not only because of the obvious costs associated with an appeal, but also be-
cause more detailed records of the arbitration would have to be kept. Broad review
would also prevent speedy resolution of the dispute, because the arbitrators' award could
not be collected while an appeal was pending. Section 29(b) of the Code simply provides:
"Unless the law directs otherwise, all awards rendered pursuant to this Code shall be
deemed final and not subject to review or appeal." Uniform Code of Arbitration, supra
note 21, § 29(b).
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III. ENFORCEABILITY OF CUSTOMER'S PRE-DISPUTE AGREEMENT
TO ARBITRATE
Under present law, an investor may agree to submit to arbitration an
existing controversy with a broker-dealer.8 5 Securities investors are often
required, as a condition to opening an account with a broker-dealer, to
sign an agreement to arbitrate future disputes.8 6 Under the United States
Arbitration Act (federal Arbitration Act or Arbitration Act),8 7 agree-
ments to arbitrate future disputes are, in general, specifically enforcea-
ble.8 The Arbitration Act also provides for a stay of litigation pending
the arbitration. 9 Similarly, most states recognize valid arbitration agree-
ments, and have enacted statutes setting forth procedures to implement
them.90
85. Malena v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1984 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,492, at 98,449 (E.D.N.Y. April 18, 1984); see Tullis v.
Kohlmeyer & Co., 551 F.2d 632, 637 (5th Cir. 1977); Krause, Securities Litigation: The
Unsolved Problem of Predispute Arbitration Agreements for Pendent Claims, 29 De Paul
L.Rev. 693, 694 (1980).
86. The standard arbitration clause "authorizes the customer to elect the arbitration
forum from a list of several organizations. If the customer does not elect the forum within
five days after receipt from the broker-dealer of a notification requesting such election,
the broker-dealer becomes authorized to make the election." Sec. Exch. Act Release No.
15984 n.4, (July 2, 1979), reprinted in 17 SEC Docket 1167, 1169 n.4 (June-Aug. 1979)
[hereinafter cited as Securities Release]. The extent to which customers are, as a practical
matter, "required" to sign what can basically be described as a typical industry-wide
agreement containing a pre-dispute arbitration clause is a critical question. This is partic-
ularly so if "the customer may be precluded from doing business with the broker-dealer if
he or she refuses to sign the agreement or the broker-dealer is unwilling to accept any
modification of its terms." Id. at 1169. It would appear that such agreements are largely
in effect with respect to margin, option and commodity accounts, and, to a lesser degree,
cash accounts. See Stansbury & Klein, The Arbitration of Investor-Broker Disputes: A
Summary of Development, 35 Arb. J. 30, 32 (1980). As to the presently prevailing prac-
tice in opening new accounts, however, the author's "horseback" survey indicates that
customers' agreements containing pre-dispute arbitration clauses are still generally re-
quired in opening margin, option and commodity accounts, but not necessarily for cash
accounts. This difference probably stems from the fact that the former usually involve an
extension of some form of credit by the firm to the customer, thus increasing the need for
speedy resolution of problems through arbitration.
87. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
88. Section 2 of the Act provides: "A written provision in. .. a contract evidencing
a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising
out of such contract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." Id. § 2 (emphasis
added). Because the Federal Arbitration Act applies to claims arising from transactions
involving interstate commerce, id., and because securities dealings usually involve such
transactions, state securities claims, as well as those arising under the federal securities
laws, are usually arbitrable. See infra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
89. See 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982).
90. See, eg., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 12-501 to -518 (1982 & Supp. 1983); Cal. Civ.
Proc. Code §§ 1280 to -88.8 (West 1982 & West Supp. 1984); Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-408
to -424 (1960 & Supp. 1984); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §§ 5701-5725 (1975 & Supp. 1982);
N. Y. Civ. Prac. Law §§ 7501-7514 (McKinney 1980 & Supp. 1983). Recently, the
Supreme Court stated that the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982), creates a
substantive rule that is applicable in state as well as federal courts. Southland Corp. v.
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A. The Wilko Exemption
Section 14 of the the Securities Act of 1933, (Securities Act or 1933
Act)91 provides that "[any] condition, stipulation, or provision binding
any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provi-
sion of this subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission
shall be void."92 In view of this nonwaiver provision, what effect would a
pre-dispute arbitration clause-such as those found in most broker-deal-
ers' customer agreements-have upon a claim arising out of the Securi-
ties Act?9 3 The Supreme Court faced this issue in Wilko v. Swan,94 which
case involved a claim by a customer against a securities brokerage firm to
recover damages under section 12(2) of the Securities Act.9" The broker-
age firm moved, pursuant to section 3 of the Arbitration Act,96 to stay
the trial of the action until an arbitration was held according to the terms
of a pre-dispute arbitration clause contained in margin agreements be-
tween the parties.9" The lower court held that the Securities Act did not
prohibit an agreement to refer future controversies to arbitration.9" The
Supreme Court reversed, based on the purposes of the federal Securities
Keating, 104 S. CL 852, 860-61 (1984); see Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388
U.S. 395, 405 (1967). The Court in Southland further stated that Congress "intended to
foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agree-
ments." Southland, 104 S. Ct. at 861; see Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Co., 103 S. Ct. 927, 941 (1983); see also Committee on Arbitration of the Ass'n
of the Bar of the City of New York, An Outline of Procedure under New York Arbitration
Law 15-16 (Dec. 1970) (discusion of whether Congress' intent in passing the Federal
Arbitration Act was to create a national substantive law that is applicable to states).
91. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982).
92. Id.
93. The Securities Act of 1933 provides for civil liability. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771, 77o
(1982). The 1933 Act is concerned primarily with the initial distribution of securities,
and requires full and fair disclosure of the character of the securities sold to the public.
See Katsoris, Accountants' Third Party Liability-How Far Do We Go? 36 Fordham L
Rev. 191, 208-09 (1967).
94. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
95. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 428. Section 12 of the Securities Act provides:
Any person who ... (2) offers or sells a security ... by the use of any means
or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of
the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an
untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or
omission), and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know,
and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or
omission, shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who
may sue either at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to
recover the consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, less the
amount of any income received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for
damages if he no longer owns the security.
15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982) (special rights provision).
96. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982).
97. Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 430 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
98. Id. at 445.
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and Arbitration Acts.99
The Court noted that the Securities Act was designed to protect inves-
tors from fraud by requiring full disclosure on the part of the dealer.10o
In order to effectuate this policy, Congress in section 12 specifically gave
investors a "special right to recover for misrepresentation which differs
substantially from the common-law action in that the seller is made to
assume the burden of proving lack of scienter."'' The Court further
noted that an investor could not waive this special right,0 2 and that sec-
tion 22 of the 1933 Act0 3 specifically affords to the plantiff national ser-
vice of process and a broad choice of forum by making the right
enforceable by the investor "in any court of competent jurisdiction-fed-
eral or state."'" The Court then noted that the essential purpose of the
Arbitration Act was-in contrast to the Securities Act's purpose of pro-
viding a judicial forum for the resolution of securities disputes-to avoid
the delay and expense of litigation,1"5 whenever possible, in controversies
involving statutes as well as case law.' 06
Faced with these two conflicting policies, the Court concluded that
although the enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements might be
economically advantageous, 0 7 Congress' desire to protect investors
would be more effectively served by holding invalid any pre-dispute arbi-
tration agreements relating to issues arising under the Securities Act. 08
In effect, the Court in Wilko concluded that the nonwaiver provision of
section 14 of the Securities Act,'0 9 in conjunction with the special rights
provision of section 12' "o and the special process and forum provision of
section 22," implicitly repealed the Arbitration Act with regard to se-
curity claims arising under the 1933 Act." 2
99. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. at 431-38.
100. Id. at 431.
101. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982).
102. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. at 434.
103. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1982).
104. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. at 431
Section 22 provides:
Any such suit or action may be brought in the district wherein the defendant is
found or is an inhabitant or transacts business, or in the district where the offer
or sale took place, if the defendant participated therein, and process in such
cases may be served in any other district of which the defendant is an inhabitant
or wherever the defendant may be found .... No case arising under this
subchapter and brought in any State court of competent jurisdiction shall be
removed to any court of the United States.
15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1982).
105. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. at 431.
106. Id. at 432.
107. Id. at 438.
108. Id.
109. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982). See supra notes 92, 102 and accompanying text.
110. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982). See supra notes 101-2 and accompanying text.
111. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1982). See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
112. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. at 438.
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Thus, Wilko holds that a member firm may not bind a customer to
arbitration to the exclusion of his private remedies under section 12(2) of
the Securities Act.' 13 Although Wilko does not prohibit such an ar-
rangement, it renders it unenforceable when a member firm tries to inter-
pose it as a defense to a suit under the 1933 Act.1 14 Courts generally will
not apply the Wilko restraint, however, when it is clear that the parties
are knowledgeable persons-for example, a sophisticated investor and a
broker-dealer-and that the arbitration agreement was the result of an
arm's length transaction." 5
Nothing that has been said about pre-dispute arbitration clauses, how-
ever, prevents an investor from consenting to submit an existing contro-
versy with a broker-dealer to arbitration.16 Moreover, the limitation on
pre-dispute arbitration clauses in securities disputes does not extend to
State claims which are not based upon federal securities law." 7 Indeed,
"the arbitrability of claims arising under state statutory or common law
is determined solely by reference to either state arbitration law or the
Federal Arbitration Act."' 1 8
113. Id.
114. The caption appearing in the front of SICA's Procedures Booklet advises a cus-
tomer that even though he signed an agreement containing a provision to arbitrate any
future controversies arising under the agreement, Wilko establishes that he cannot "be
compelled to arbitrate a claim arising under certain federal securities acts." Procedures
Booklet, supra note 23, at i. In other words, while a pre-dispute clause may still be in-
cluded in a broker-customer agreement, it may be of no effect when a dispute arises under
the federal securities law.
115. Alco Standard Corp. v. Benalal, 345 F. Supp. 14,24 (E.D. Pa. 1972); GCA Corp.
v. Coler, [1971-72 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,339 at 91, 815
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 1975); Peloso, Agreements to Arbitrate, 13 Rev. Sec. Reg. 943, 946
(1980); see Krause, supra note 85, at 703. It is also suggested that under these circum-
stances (sophisticated investor/arm's length transaction) the pre-dispute arbitration
clause should still be enforceable, despite the doctrine of adhesion. See infra notes 213-
237 and accompanying text. In addition, section 28b of the Securities and Exchange Act
specifically excepts member-to-member controversies from the nonwaiver provision of
§ 29(a) of that Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(b) (1982). One commentator has suggested that
the presence of § 28(b) in the Exchange Act indicates the Congressional view that mem-
bers of national securities exchanges are presumptively sophisticated and do not need the
protection of the Securities and Exchange Act. Peloso, supra, at 947. There is no compa-
rable exception in the nonwaiver provision of the Securities Act. The courts, however,
have reached a similar conclusion in refusing to extend the Wilko doctrine to member-to-
member controversies arising under the 1933 Act. See Brown v. Gilligan, Will & Co., 287
F. Supp. 766, 772-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Isaacson v. Hayden, Stone Inc., 319 F. Supp. 929,
930 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Peloso, supra at 947-48.
116. Recently a New York District Court stated that "[t]he principle that emerges
from the cases evaluating the validity of arbitration clauses is that, while a waiver in
futuro will not be permitted under Wilko, an agreement to arbitrate an existing dispute
made when a party has full knowledge of the facts therein will be excepted from the
Wilko doctrine." Malena v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1984 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,492 at 98,449 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 1984); see Tullis
v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 551 F.2d 632, 637 (5th Cir. 1977).
117. See Krause, supra note 85, at 694. See supra notes 97-112 and accompanying text.
118. Krause supra note 85, at 694-95.
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1. Wilko Warning
Although the Wilko exemption is well established, the SEC has ques-
tioned the extent to which the public is aware of its protection. Thus, in
1979, the SEC issued a release that criticized the continued use of arbi-
tration agreements that purported to bind customers to arbitrate all fu-
ture disputes with broker-dealers.11 9 The concern of the Commission
was that customers agreeing to such clauses z° might be unaware of their
right under Wilko to a judicial forum for the resolution of claims arising
under the federal securities laws. 12 1  Indeed, it cautioned that
"[r]equiring the signing of an arbitration agreement without adequate
disclosure as to its meaning and effect violates standards of fair dealing
with customers and constitutes conduct that is inconsistent with just and
equitable principles of trade."'22 Although the issue of pre-dispute arbi-
tration clauses was raised in SICA discussions, it was outside the limited
scope of SICA's assignment.123 In response to the SEC's concerns SICA
did, however, preface its Procedures Booklet with the following high-
lighted notation:
The Supreme Court, in the case of Wilko v. Swan, .. and other Fed-
eral Courts have held that a customer of a broker-dealer could not be
compelled to arbitrate a claim arising under certain federal securities
acts, even though the customer had signed an agreement with the bro-
ker-dealer to arbitrate future controversies. If you have signed such a
pre-dispute arbitration agreement, you may wish to consult with coun-
sel before proceeding with arbitration. 124
119. Securities Release, supra note 86, at 1169 & n.4.
120. See supra note 86.
121. Securities Release, supra note 86, at 1167.
122. Id. at 1169.
123. SICA was never intended, and was never given any authority, to discipline the
conduct of broker-dealers or dictate their conduct. Its sole purpose was to prepare and
monitor a Code of Arbitration. Indeed, in a separate dissenting statement to the Securi-
ties Release, Commissioner Karmel reasoned:
I object to the issuance of the Commission's release because I believe it improp-
erly casts doubt on the efficacy and fairness of arbitration and thus undermines
the valuable work of the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration
("SICA"). Further, I do not believe that there is sufficient evidence of over-
reaching of customers by broker-dealers using arbitration clauses in standard
customer agreements to justify the issuance of the release. To the contrary,
arbitration is an effective and worthwhile alternative to litigation for resolving
disputes which reduces the costs to both the customer and the broker-dealer. In
my opinion the use of arbitration clauses in customer agreements does not vio-
late or raise questions under the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities
laws. To the extent the Commission considers changes in such clauses neces-
sary or appropriate to comport with just and equitable principles of trade, re-
quested changes should have been directed to SICA or appropriate industry
self-regulatory organizations.
Securities Release, supra note 86, at 1170 (Karmel, Commissioner, dissenting).
124. Procedures Booklet, supra note 23, at i. A warning to the customer is a prerequi-
site to the enforceability of a predispute arbitration agreement under the Commodity
Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 7-26 (1982). The agreement is enforceable if:
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Not satisfied with the progress of the broker-dealers in amending existing
or future customers' agreements to include some sort of a Wilko warning
regarding arbitration, 2 ' the SEC then proposed Rule 15c2-2,126 which
provides, in part, that it
shall be a fraudulent, manipulative or deceptive act or practice for a
broker or dealer to enter into an agreement with any customer which
purports to bind the customer to the arbitration of future disputes be-
tween them arising under the federal securities laws, [unless such
agreement discloses that:] '[a]rbitration cannot be compelled with re-
spect to disputes arising under the federal securities laws'. 127
Despite severe criticism, 12 1 this rule became effective on December 31,
1983.129
2. Wilko Application
Although the Court in Wilko was concerned only with the arbitrability
of claims brought under section 12(2) of the 1933 Act, 30 courts have
subsequently held that claims based on violations of sections 5 and 17 of
the 1933 Act may also be nonarbitrable.' 3 ' Moreover, it is generally con-
tended that the Wilko prohibition also extends to claims based on viola-
tion of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act or 1934
a. executing the agreement is not essential to access to the market;
b. customer... separately signs the arbitration clause or agreement; and,
c. customer is given a warning, in bold face type, that he is surrendering certain
rights to assert his claim in court
17 C.F.R. § 180.3(b)(1), (2), (6) (1984).
125. Precipitating the release was the SEC's concern that, despite the Commissioner's
advice, broker-dealers and security industry organizations had failed to modify arbitra-
tion clauses in customer agreements to reflect the Wilko ruling. Securities Release, supra
note 86, at 1167 n.7.
126. Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 19813 (May 26, 1983), reprinted in 27 SEC Docket
1260 (Feb.-June 1983).
127. Id. at 1263.The rule was adopted in Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 20397 (Dec. 28,
1983), 48 Fed. Reg. 53404 (1983) (to be codifed at 17 C.F.R_ § 240.15c2-2); 3 Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 26,916, at 20,173-2 (1983).
128. See Karmel, Securities Regulation, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 20, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
129. 48 Fed. Reg. 53404 (1983) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2); see 3 Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 26,916 at 20,173-2 (1983).
130. See supra notes 94-108 and accompanying text.
131. Section 5 of the Securities Act prohibits the use of the mails or any interstate
commerce to sell or deliver after sale any security that has not met the registration, filing
and prospectus requirements of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982). Section 17 prohibits the
use of interstate commerce for the purpose of selling or offering for sale fraudulent securi-
ties. 15 U.S.C. §77 q (1982); see Laupheimer v. McDonnell & Co., 500 F.2d 21, 25 (2d
Cir. 1974) (section 5 claims are nonarbitrable); Maheu v. Reynolds & Co., 282 F. Supp.
423, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (same); Davend Corp. v. Michael, [1975-76 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,540, at 99,730 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 1976) (section 17 claims
are nonarbitrable); Frier Indus., Inc. v. Glickman, [1974-75 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L
Rep. (CCH) 94,845, at 96,848 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 1974) (same); Cohen v. Franchard
Corp., [1970-71 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,810, at 90,048 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 23, 1970) (same).
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Act) 132  when the claim does not involve a member-to-member
controversy. 1
33
It is often difficult, however, to determine whether a claim arises out of
the federal securities laws, 134 particularly if it is based upon relief implied
by section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. 135 For example, one court has
stated that:
[if the] plaintiffs' claim is nothing more than a garden-variety cus-
tomer's suit against a broker for breach of contract, [it] cannot be boot-
strapped into an alleged violation of § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, or
Rule lOb-5, in the absence of allegation of facts amounting to scienter,
intent to defraud, reckless disregard for the truth, or knowing use of a
device, scheme or artifice to defraud. 136
132. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1982).
133. See Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d 831, 835
(7th Cir. 1977); Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d 532, 536
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1976); Laupheimer v. McDonnell & Co., 500 F.2d
21, 26 (2d Cir. 1974); Reader v. Hirsch & Co., 197 F. Supp. 111, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1961);
Krause, supra note 85, at 704. Liability under the Exchange Act is generally founded on§ 18, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1982), and the implied provisions of § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1982), and the Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240
(1984). Most 1934 Act investor claims against brokers, however, involve § 10(b) of the
Act. Bell & Fitzgerald, Mixed Arbitrable/Nonarbitrable Disputes, 16 Rev. See. Reg. 849,
851-52 (1983). Unlike the Securities Act, which is concerned primarily with the initial
distribution of securities, see supra note 93, the Exchange Act deals principally with post-
distribution trading. Katsoris, supra note 93, at 214.
134. See Peloso, supra note 115, at 949.
135. Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facil-
ity of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982). Pursuant to this authority, the SEC promulgated rule lob-5,
which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facil-
ity of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5 (1984). Although neither § 10(b) nor rule lob-5 explicitly pro-
vides for any civil liabilities, it is well established that by making the conduct unlawful,
§ 10(b) impliedly creates a civil remedy. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459
U.S. 375, 380 (1983); L. Loss, Security Regulations 1763-97 (1961).
136. Snemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442, 445 (2d Cir. 1971) (emphasis
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Thus, Wilko would not apply to a simple contract dispute with a broker-
dealer, because the claim does not arise under the securities laws. Indeed
the Supreme Court in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,13 suggested in dic-
tum that the Wilko prohibition did not extend to a case brought under
section 10(b) of the Exchange Act or Rule lOb-5.138 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court stated that Wilko should not extend to lOb-5
claims because section 12 of the 1933 Act provides "a defrauded pur-
chaser with [a] 'special right' of a private remedy for civil liability...
[whereas] [t]here is no statutory counterpart of § 12(2) in the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and neither § 10(b) of that Act nor Rule lOb-5
speaks of a private remedy to redress violations of the kind alleged
here."' 39 The Court noted that although federal case law had established
that section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 create an implied private cause of ac-
tion, " the "Act itself does not establish the 'special right' that the Court
in Wilko found significant." 4 '
Lower courts, however, have rejected the Scherk suggestion that the
Wilko doctrine may not apply to implied causes of action under section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Act.'42 Indeed, several courts have sug-
gested that Scherk merely carves "out a narrow exception to the Wilko
holding, and is applicable only to international transactions."'413 In re-
jecting the Supreme Court's suggestion that Wilko should be limited to
claims brought under the Securities Act,'" lower courts have neglected
in original); see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 200-01 (1976). See infra note
202 and accompanying text.
137. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
138. Id. at 513-14. The Court in Scherk found a pre-dispute arbitration clause to be
enforceable, despite Wilko, in a dispute involving a 10-b5 claim. Id. The Court did not,
however, explicitly hold that Wilko did not apply to lob-5 claims. Rather, the Court
held that the pre-dispute arbitration agreement was enforceable because of the crucial
differences between the relationship of the parties in Wilko and that of the parties in
Scherk. Id. at 515. The Court emphasized that in Wilko the arbitration agreement was
between a customer and a broker, whereas in Scherk the agreement was part of a contract
between parties to an international transaction for the sale of business entities. Id. This
difference was significant because if the arbitration agreement, which provided in advance
for a specific forum for resolving disputes, was not enforced, the parties would be faced
with many uncertainties because of the various conflict of law rules that might be applied.
Id. at 515-16.
139. Id. at 513.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 514.
142. See Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1030 (6th Cir. 1979);
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Moore, 590 F.2d 823, 827-29 (10th Cir.
1978); Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d 831, 835 (7th
Cir. 1977); Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d 532, 536 &
n.12 (3d Cir. 1976); Newman v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 383 F. Supp. 265, 268 (W.D.
Tex. 1974).
143. Newman v. Shearson, Hammill & Co. Inc., 383 F. Supp. 265, 268 (V.D. Tex.
1974); see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Moore, 590 F.2d 823, 828
(10th Cir. 1978); Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d
831, 835 (7th Cir. 1977).
144. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
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to consider all the factors which supported the Court's decision in
Wilko. 145
Lower courts have extended Wilko to lOb-5 claims arising under the
Exchange Act, because section 29 of the Exchange Act 146 contains a non-
waiver provision similar to section 14 of the Securities Act. 147 Section 29
of the Exchange Act provides that "[a]ny condition, stipulation or provi-
sion binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this
chapter or any rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an ex-
change required thereby shall be void." '48
In reaching this conclusion, however, the courts have ignored several
factors. In Wilko, the arbitration of the investor's claim was not com-
pelled despite the Arbitration Act,149 because of the combined effect of
three specific and special provisions contained in the 1933 Act: section
14, the nonwaiver provision; 150 section 12, the special rights provision;' 15
and section 22, the special forum and service of process provision. 15 2 In
applying Wilko to lOb-5 claims the courts have disregarded the fact that
the Exchange Act does not contain a special rights provision similar to
section 12 of the Securities Act.'5 3 In fact, neither section 10(b) nor rule
lOb-5 explicitly provides for a civil remedy. 54 Rather, as the Scherk
court noted, a private cause of action thereunder has been judicially cre-
ated. 5 5 The scope of the Exchange Act's jurisdictional provision"' is
also narrower than that of the Securities Act. 157 Although both section
22 of the Securities Act,15 8 and section 27 of the Exchange Act'59 provide
the plaintiff with nationwide service, the latter restricts jurisdiction to the
federal courts,'I whereas the former provides for jurisdiction in state
and federal courts.' 6'
It is illogical to insist that the general nonwaiver provision of the Ex-
145. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431-38 (1953). See supra notes 107-112.
146. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1982).
147. Id. § 77n; see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, Smith, Inc. v. Moore, 590 F.2d 823,
827 (10th Cir. 1978); Starkman v. Seroussi, 377 F. Supp. 518, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Mo-
ran v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 389 F.2d 242, 245 (3d Cir. 1968); Colonial
Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 183 n.5 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817
(1966).
148. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1982).
149. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
150. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982).
151. Id. § 771.
152. Id. § 77v(a).
153. Id. § 771.
154. See supra notes 135, 137-41 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 135, 140-44 and accompanying text.
156. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982).
157. Id. § 77v(a).
158. Id.
159. Id. § 78aa.
160. Id.
161. Id. § 77v(a).
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change Act' 62 overrides the Arbitration Act 63 in the same manner as
section 14 of the Securities Act,"6 when the Exchange Act's nonwaiver
provision 165 is not buttressed by special rights and broad jurisdictional
provisions similar to those found in the Securities Act. 66 This is espe-
cially true because a private cause of action under section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act is merely a judicially created action.' 67 Moreover, by lim-
iting the reach of Wilko to 1933 Act claims, the purpose of the Arbitra-
tion Act 68 is furthered and a cap is effectively placed on the problems
which arise when a nonarbitrable federal securities claim is mixed with
an arbitrable state claim. ' 69
Thus, although Scherk involved a lOb-5 claim arising out of an inter-
national securities transaction, 70 the Court's suggestion that the Wilko
prohibition be limited to 1933 Act claims""' should be followed in do-
mestic cases as well. The Supreme Court will have the opportunity to
limit the Wilko prohibition to 1933 Act claims in Byrd Y. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc.,7' which is currently pending before the Court, and in-
volves the arbitrability of state claims as well as a claim under section
10(b) of the Exchange Act. 173
B. Mixed Claims
A claimant will sometimes allege both federal securities law violations,
which are not arbitrable without consent of the customer despite a pre-
dispute arbitration clause, and arbitrable state law claims. What should
162. Id. § 78cc(a).
163. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
164. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982).
165. Id. § 78cc(a).
166. See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 135, 139-41 and accompanying text.
168. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
169. See infra notes 174-206 and accompanying text for a discussion of these problems.
170. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 515 (1974).
171. Id. at 513-14.
172. 726 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1983), cerL granted, 104 S. Ct. 3509 (1984).
173. The Ninth Circuit in Byrd denied arbitration of the investor's lob-5 claim because
of Wilko. Byrd, 726 F.2d at 554. In addition, the court denied arbitration of the state
claims because the court felt they were intertwined with the investor's lob-s claim. Id.
See infra notes 174-206 and accompanying text for a discussion of the problems that arise
when federal securities claims are mixed with state claims. In reaching its decision the
Ninth Circuit never discussed the fact that the claim arose under the Exchange Act and
not the Securities Act, and never referred to the Supreme Court's dicta in Scherk that
Wilko should not apply to lOb-5 claims. See supra notes 137-41 and accompanying text.
In deciding Byrd, the Supreme Court will have to decide whether to limit Wilko to 1933
Act claims or extend Wilko to 1934 Act claims. If the Court decides to extend Wilko to
1934 Act claims, it must establish a standard for resolving disputes when nonarbitrable
federal securities claims are mixed with arbitrable state claims. See infra notes 174-205
and accompanying text. If, however, the Court decides to limit Wilko to 1933 Act
claims, it will not be required to establish a standard for resolving mixed claims because
the investor's federal securities claim in Byrd would be arbitrable along with his state
claims.
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a court do when faced with a motion to stay the litigation pending arbi-
tration of the arbitrable claims?'74
1. Bifurcation
Where such mixed claims are severable, many courts have split them,
citing a strong federal policy favoring liberal enforcement of arbitration
agreements. This permits the arbitrable state claims to proceed to arbi-
tration and the federal securities claims to be litigated. 17  Other courts,
however, have stayed arbitration of the arbitrable claims until all the fed-
eral securities law claims have been determined.1 76 Those courts justified
this delay on the grounds that the facts giving rise to both sets of claims
were similar, and to the extent similar, should be resolved in litigation
rather than in arbitration.17 7 Some commentators have suggested that:
[w]hen confronted with numerous state claims pendent to a federal
securities law claim but subject to a valid arbitration agreement, a dis-
trict court should sever the pendent claims, order them to arbitration,
and stay the arbitration pending adjudication of the federal securities
law claim retained in the district court. This solution of bifurcated
resolution preserves the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts over
Exchange Act claims, gives appropriate weight to the federal policy
favoring arbitration, and enforces the contractual agreement of the
parties. "'
Automatic bifurcation is not a complete answer to the problems
174. Indeed, to avoid the problem of Wilko and mixed claims, some SROs will not
proceed with an arbitration against a public customer without his consent, unless a court
order has been obtained.
175. See Macchiavelli v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 384 F. Supp. 21, 31 (E.D. Cal.
1974) (arbitrable contract claim severed from a Rule lob-5 claim); Krause, supra note 85,
at 710 (arbitrable pendent claims should be severed and proceed to arbitration).
176. See, e.g., Peacock v. Oppenheimer & Co., [1979-80 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) % 97,201, at 96,587 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 1979); Todd v. Oppenheimer & Co.,
78 F.R.D. 415, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
177. See, e.g., Peacock v. Oppenheimer & Co., [1979-80 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 97,201, at 96,587 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 1979); Todd v. Oppenheimer & Co.,
78 F.R.D. 415, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). But see DeHart v. Moore, 424 F. Supp. 55, 57
(S.D. Fla. 1976) (court permitted arbitration to proceed even though state and common
law claims were based on same facts).
178. Bell & Fitzgerald, supra note 133, at 853 (footnote omitted); see Peacock v. Op-
penheimer & Co., [1979-80 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,201, at
96,587 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 1970). In Peacock, the court stated that
By compelling arbitration of the common law counts in plaintiffs' complaint, we
believe we are only ordering the parties to do that which they bargained for.
Concededly, there is likely to be some duplication of effort between the judicial
proceeding concerning Count I and the arbitration proceedings. We will stay
arbitration until after the trial on Count I, however, and assume that the arbi-
trators will be influenced by our resolution of those issues common to both
proceedings.
Id.; see also Dickinson v. Heinold Sec., Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 644 (7th Cir. 1981) (In a
bench trial, "detailed findings of fact . . . should eliminate much of the duplication
through the impact of collateral estoppel on the subsequent arbitration.").
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caused by mixed claims, because even if the arbitrable claims are stayed
pending disposition of the federal securities claims, the question arises as
to what extent "similar" or "related" findings of fact in the federal secur-
ities suit would be binding in the subsequent arbitration on the grounds
of res judicata or collateral estoppel. Indeed, because arbitrators are not
bound by the customary doctrines of substantive law, it is not clear what
res judicata or collateral estoppel effect arbitrators would accord to a
prior judgment. 79 Thus, similar or factually related issues might still be
tried in two different forums.1
80
2. Intertwining
When it is impractical if not impossible to separate arbitrable state
claims from nonarbitrable federal securities claims-for example, when
the issue of churning a customer's account is the basis of both the federal
securities claim as well as the state claims' 8'-some courts have held that
arbitration as to the arbitrable claims should be denied and that all issues
should be tried together.'82 This approach has been referred to as the
"doctrine of intertwining."'8 3 This exception to the general rule that ar-
bitrable claims should be referred to arbitration was developed in order
to preserve the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts in areas where
such exclusivity exists.' For example, the court in Cunningham v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc."5 stated that "[the Arbitration Act's] goal of
avoiding litigation where arbitration would be cheaper and faster would
be disserved if the court were to bifurcate the proceedings and compel
arbitration of the pendent claims." 8 6 In cases where the federal and
179. See N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 7511, commentary at 7511:5, at 582 (McKinney 1982)
(commentary by Joseph M. McLaughlin). But see Dickinson v. Heinold Sec., Inc., 661
F.2d 638, 644 (7th Cir. 1981).
180. See infra note 201 and accompanying text. In addition, the automatic stay of the
arbitrable claims pending disposition of the federal securities claim would give the parties
the benefit of discovery obtained in the court action in any subsequent arbitration. See
supra note 52 and accompanying text.
181. See Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 335 (5th Cir. 1981).
182. See, eg., id. at 335; Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540, 544 (5th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977).
183. See Miley, 637 F.2d at 335; Cunningham v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 550 F.
Supp. 578, 581 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
184. See Byrd v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 726 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir. 1983), cerL
granted, 104 S. Ct. 3509 (1984); Miley v. Oppenhemier & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 335 (5th Cir.
1981); see also Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 824 (1977) (denial of arbitration is justified in a case where "arbitrator making a
decison on the common law claims would have been impelled to review the same facts
needed to establish the plaintiff's securities law claim"). In Sibley, however, the federal
securities law claim was pleaded in the alternative, and its existence depended on the
resolution of the contractual dispute. Sibley, 543 F.2d at 544 n.5. The Court "therefore
ordered that. . . the federal securities claim and other pendent state claims be stayed
pending resolution of the contractual dispute through arbitration." Bell & Fitzgerald,
supra note 133 at 852 n.22 (citing Sibley, 543 F.2d at 544 n.5).
185. 550 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
186. Id. at 585.
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state claims are inseparable, arbitration will not provide a cheaper forum
because the federal claims will have to be litigated separately, and thus
the goal of avoiding litigation through arbitration is unattainable.
This conclusion, however, does not comport with the legislative his-
tory of the Arbitration Act,187 which emphasizes the congressional goal
of enforcement of contractual commitments. 88 Nor is the court's con-
clusion consistent with the Supreme Court's recent statement in Moses
H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.189 that "the
relevant federal law requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give
effect to an arbitration agreement."'9 0 Indeed, the Seventh Circuit, in
Dickinson v. Heinold Securities, Inc., 91 held that the alleged inefficiency
was "somewhat speculative," and insufficient to destroy the right to arbi-
tration. 192 The court further concluded that "[t]he intertwining doctrine
would always threaten to become the exception that swallowed the rule,
allowing the presence of a non-arbitrable claim to force a trial on the
otherwise arbitrable claims."' 93
3. Alternatives
The split among the circuit courts concerning the treatment of mixed
claims'" may soon be resolved by the Supreme Court in Byrd v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc.'95 In Byrd, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision to deny Dean Witter's motion to compel arbitration,,96
stating that under Wilko the arbitration of claims arising under the Ex-
187. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
188. Bell & Fitzgerald, supra note 133, at 853.
189. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
190. Id. at 20 (emphasis in original); see Southland Corp. v. Keating, 104 S. Ct. 852,
859 (1984); Surman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 733 F.2d 59, 63 (8th Cir.
1984).
191. 661 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1981).
192. Id. at 644.
193. Id. at 645-46; see Brodsky & Frumento, Arbitration and the Securities Laws, 15
Rev. Sec. Reg. 850, 854 (1982).
194. The Ninth, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have all adopted the intertwining doc-
trine. See Byrd v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 726 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
granted, 104 S. Ct. 3509 (1984); Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 693
F.2d 1023, 1026 (l1th Cir. 1982); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Haydu,
675 F.2d 1169, 1172-73 (1 1th Cir. 1982); Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 335
(5th Cir. 1981); Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 824 (1977). The Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have all rejected the doctrine.
Surman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 733 F.2d 59, 62 (8th Cir. 1984); Lis-
key v. Oppenheimer & Co., 717 F.2d 314, 317-20 (6th Cir. 1983); Dickinson v. Heinold
Sec., Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 643-46 (7th Cir. 1981); see also Kavit v. A.L. Stamm & Co., 491
F.2d 1176, 1182 (2d Cir. 1974) (intertwining doctrine rejected in dictum). Similarly, the
D.C. Circuit has rejected the doctrine of intertwining when arbitrable pendent state
claims were joined with nonarbitrable federal antitrust claims. Lee v. Ply*Gem Indus.,
Inc., 593 F.2d 1266, 1274-75 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979).
195. 726 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 3509 (1984).
196. Id. at 554.
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change Act was not compelled. 9 The court explained that
when there are arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims arising out of the
same transaction, the district court should have discretion to evaluate
the degree to which the claims are intertwined. If the district court
determines that they are so intertwined that the purposes of the Arbi-
tration Act and the protective intent of the federal securities laws
would be frustrated by separating the claims, then it should refuse to
separate them.
198
If the Supreme Court agrees that Wilko applies to claims under the 1934
Act, the Court must then determine how these claims should be resolved
when they are mixed with state claims.' 99 Regardless of what standard
the Supreme Court adopts, many of the problems involving intertwined
securities claims will persist as long as the Wilko exception to arbitration
agreements survives."c° If the Court establishes a rule of automatic bifur-
cation, for example, similar or factually related issues may be tried before
different forums, resulting in unnecessary delay, duplication and incon-
venience. 201 On the other hand, if the court establishes a rule of strict
prohibition against severance, lawyers may be encouraged to plead color-
able federal securities claims, thereby systematically preventing the arbi-
tration of independent claims based upon state law. 2 Assuming the
Wilko prohibition continues to exist, a rule of automatic bifurcation or
strict prohibition against severance should be avoided and the trial court
should be given some discretion to sever or join the claims, depending
upon the equities before it. A policy generally favoring bifurcation seems
preferable, except where the facts of the arbitrable and nonarbitrable
claims are clearly inseparable and the securities law claim is more than
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 92-117, 176-95 and accompanying text.
201. In an era of calendar congestion, see supra note 6, this potential for duplication
and delay is ill-advised. See supra note 179 and accompanying text for a discussion of
what, if any, collateral estoppel effect a federal securities suit would have on a subsequent
arbitration. Automatic bifurcation also runs contrary to the federal policy of pendent
jurisdiction, which encourages parties to resolve their claims in one proceeding. See
United Mineworkers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725-27 (1966); Krause, supra note 85 at 717.
202. Under liberal pleading rules in federal couts, see Droppleman v. Horsley, 372
F.2d 249, 250 (10th Cir. 1967); Barnes v. Irving Trust Co., 290 F. Supp. 116, 117 (S.D.
Tex. 1968), the specious nature of federal securities claims may not be apparent until
after extensive discovery or a lengthy trial, thus delaying arbitration procedures that
should have been immediately available to the parties. "[T]he typical mixed arbitrable/
nonarbitrable claims case involves a lOb-5 action and various pendent state claims such as
common law fraud, breach of contract, or breach of fiduciary duty asserted as independ-
ent claims all arising out of the same factual scenario. . . ." Bell & Fitzgerald, supra
note 133, at 852 n.22. The difference between the two types of claims often revolves
around mental state-an element that can be established only after a trial. For example,
"whereas negligence could support a claim for breach of fiduciary duty and no mental
state need be shown for breach of contract, scienter is an element of an action under rule
lOb-5." Krause, supra note 85, at 712 (footnotes omitted). See supra note 136 and accom-
panying text.
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"the rather small tail to a much larger dog. '20 3 Discretionary bifurca-
tion will help to avoid the problems caused when a sham lOb-5 claim is
pleaded in order to prevent or delay arbitration, and the congressional
mandate favoring arbitration-as evidenced by the Arbitration ACt2°a-
will be furthered, and should prevail over the judicially created doctrine
of intertwining. A better solution, however, is to judicially limit the
reach of Wilko by not extending it to 1934 Act claims 20 5 or legislatively
abolishing the Wilko exception in order to avoid the problems caused
when federal securities claims are pleaded with state claims.20 6
C. Contract of Adhesion
Another basis for refusing to enforce an arbitration agreement is the
doctrine of "adhesion. 2 07 Adhesion arises when a standardized con-
tract, usually drafted by a party of superior bargaining power, is
presented to a party whose choice is limited to accepting or rejecting the
contract without the opportunity to negotiate its terms.20 8 Such agree-
ments are usually used when a party enters into similar transactions with
many individuals, 209and the agreements resemble ultimatums or laws
rather than mutually negotiated contracts.210
Generally, there are two judicially imposed limitations on the enforce-
203. Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
824 (1977). Admittedly, granting such discretion might cause some forum shopping, but
automatic bifurcation hardly seems a workable panacea. See supra note 201 and accom-
panying text.
204. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
205. The claim protected in Wilko involved the special right of an aggrieved purchaser,
under § 12 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §771 (1982), to recover for misrepresentation.
In such a case, the burden shifts to the seller to prove the lack of scienter. See supra notes
100-104 and accompanying text. This is not the case with a 1934 Act claim, particularly
when the cause of action is judicially implied under § 10b. See supra notes 107-144 and
accompanying text. To hold an agreement to arbitrate unenforceable when the dispute
involves a 10b claim is to elevate a judicially implied right of action to the level of a
special right created by Congress under § 12 of the Securities Act. 15 U.S.C. §771 (1982).
In view of the strong Congressional policy favoring arbitration and the serious problems
of intertwining and bifurcation that arise when federal security claims are mixed with
state claims, see supra notes 178-202 and accompanying text, Wilko should not be ex-
tended to 1934 Act claims.
206. The Wilko exception should be abolished, however, only if a separate organiza-
tion is established to govern arbitrations. See infra notes 259-63 and accompanying text.
207. See Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract,
43 Colum. L. Rev. 629, 630-33 (1943); Murray, Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31
U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 28-34 (1969); see Wright, Arbitration Clauses in Adhesion Contracts, 33
Arb. J., June 1978, at 41, 42.
208. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, Contracts § 1-33, at 6 (2d ed. 1977); see Quinn, Uniform
Commercial Code Commentary and Law Digest 2-302[A], at 2-95-96 (1978).
209. Kessler, supra note 207, at 631; Lenhoff, Contracts of Adhesion and the Freedom
of Contract: A Comparative Study in the Light of American and Foreign Law, 36 Tul. L.
Rev. 481, 481-82 (1962).
210. Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 206 (2d Cir. 1955); see Slaw-
son, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 Harv. L.
Rev. 529, 553 (1971).
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ment of adhesion contracts or their provisions. 21 First, regardless of any
general "duty to read," such a contract or provision which does not fall
within the reasonable expectations of the weaker or 'adhering' party will
not be enforced against him.212 Second, a contract or a provision, even if
consistent with the reasonable expectations of the parties, will be denied
enforcement if, considered in its context, it is unduly oppressive, uncon-
scionable or against public policy.2 3 A great deal has been written about
the interrelationship of the duty to read, reasonable expectations, uncon-
scionability and public policy,214 and it is unneccesary to review this ma-
terial. Instead, let us narrow the inquiry to the subject at hand by
making certain assumptions.
Assume that a customer is required to sign an arbitration clause typi-
cal of those found in standard broker-customer securities agreements
before he can open an account.2 15 Would a customer be relieved of his
arbitration obligation because there was no duty to read, and conse-
quently no true assent? Apparently not, because the investor could rea-
sonably have expected to find a pre-dispute arbitration clause in the
agreement.21 6 Would such a clause be contrary to public policy? Again,
it would appear not, because of the policies underlying the federal Arbi-
tration Act.
2 17
A more interesting question is whether such a typical industry-wide
arbitration agreement, imposed by the securities industry upon its cus-
tomers, 2 1 is unenforceable as unduly oppressive or unconscionable. The
federal Arbitration Act2 l9 does not render this point moot, because even
though this type of transaction constitutes "commerce" and is therefore
covered by the Act, there is an exception when grounds exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.22
211. Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 28 Cal. 3d 807, 818, 623 P.2d 165, 172-73, 171 Cal.
Rptr. 604, 612 (1981).
212. Id.
213. See Id.; cf. Chretian v. Donald L. Bren. Co., 151 Cal. App. 3d 385, 388, 198 Cal.
Rptr. 523, 525, (1984) (court may deny enforcement of a nonadhesive contract if terms
are unconscionable, or may limit application of any unconscionable clause). It would
appear, however, that the burden of establishing unconscionability is greater in the case
of a freely negotiated contract than it is when a party of superior bargaining power im-
poses an industry-wide form upon the weaker party. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Mo-
tors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 386, 161 A.2d 69, 84 0960). One commentator has noted that "lain
arbitration clause is especially vulnerable to attack if one party has not voluntarily agreed
to it, because a fundamental factor in the courts' willingness to enforce arbitration clauses
is their voluntary nature." Wright, supra note 207, at 43 (footnote omitted).
214. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 208, § 9-37-46, at 316-47; Kessler, supra
note 207, at 630-35; Murray, supra note 207, at 14-34; Slawson, supra note 210, at 549-61.
215. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. For a discussion of whether custom-
ers, as a practical matter, are generally precluded from dealing with broker-dealers unless
they sign such agreements, see supra note 86.
216. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
217. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982). See supra notes 104-106 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 86.
219. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
220. Id. § 2.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
In Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc.221 the California Supreme Court held
that a music promoter was not bound by an arbitration award rendered
pursuant to the rules of the American Federation of Musicians (AFM),
despite his agreement to arbitrate according to those rules.2 22 The court
stated that the agreement to arbitrate according to AFM rules was a
contract of adhesion and unconscionable.2 23 The rules allowed a mem-
ber of the union (in fact, one of its executive officers) to be an arbitrator,
and having an arbitrator so aligned with one party was "so inimical to
fundamental notions of fairness as to require nonenforcement. 224
Shortly after Scissor-Tail, the California Court of Appeals rendered a
somewhat related decision in Hope v. Superior Court of Santa Clara
County.225Hope involved two Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. (Shearson)
account executives who sued Shearson for commissions. 226 Shearson
moved to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration on the basis of an
employment application form supplied by the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE), of which Shearson was a member. 227 This form contained an
agreement to arbitrate any controversy arising out of the employment in
accordance with the arbitration procedures of the NYSE.228 Having de-
cided that the employment contract was one of adhesion, 229 the court
proceeded to address the issue of whether the arbitration procedures of
the NYSE were unconscionable. After emphasizing that it did not find
actual bias on the part of the NYSE,230 the Hope court pointed out that
the "structure of governance of the Exchange is such that there exists a
presumptive institutional bias in favor of member firms and members
who constitute the electoral constituency of the board."23' The petition-
ers, "being outside that constituency, [had] legitimate cause to
complain." 23 2
The court in Hope was unimpressed that the arbitrators were persons
not engaged in the securities business, that the customer had a peremp-
tory challenge and that the Director of Arbitration of the SRO had the
authority to disqualify an arbitrator. 233 Instead, the court pointed out
that
[e]venhandedness could be assured by a procedure which permits se-
lection of arbitrators by the parties to the dispute or, failing that,
221. 28 Cal. 3d 807, 623 P.2d 165, 171 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1981).
222. Id. at 831, 623 P.2d at 180, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
223. Id. at 826, 623 P.2d at 177, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 616.
224. Id. at 821, 623 P.2d at 174, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 613.
225. 122 Cal. App. 3d 147, 175 Cal. Rptr. 851 (1981).
226. Id. at 149, 175 Cal Rptr. at 853.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 153, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
230. Id. at 154, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
231. Id. (emphasis in original).
232. Id.
233. Id. at 155, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
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through the auspices of some truly neutral party. In the absence of
such a procedure we must conclude, as in Scissor-Tail, that the arbitra-
tion procedures of the New York Stock Exchange fail to meet minimal
levels of integrity. 234
The California Court of Appeals reached a distinctly different conclu-
sion, however, in Parr v. Superior Court of San Mateo,235 a case involving
an arbitration clause in a broker-customer agreement. Although the Parr
Court adopted the presumptive bias test of Hope,236 it ruled that the pre-
sumption was rebutted by its finding that the arbitration procedures of
the NYSE were not unfair.2 37 The arbitration agreement thus was
enforceable.
Only time will tell what effect the doctrine of adhesion will have on the
enforceability of pre-dispute securities arbitration agreements.3 8 If
courts view standardized industry contracts containing arbitration
clauses as presumptively unfair, and therefore unenforceable, a shadow
may be cast over the effectiveness of pre-dispute arbitration clauses for
the foreseeable future2 39 even in cases where Wilko would be inapplica-
ble. Courts should not view pre-dispute arbitration clauses as uncon-
scionable, however, if the arbitration procedures are fair and involve
public participation.
IV. IMAGE OF FAIRNESS
In light of Congress' refusal to permit the public to waive its rights
under the Securities Act,2" and the possible unenforceability of arbitra-
234. Id.; see Richards v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 64 Cal. App. 3d
899, 903-04, 135 Cal. Rptr. 26, 28-29 (1976). See infra notes 245-54 and accompanying
text.
235. 139 Cal. App. 3d 440, 446-47, 188 Cal. Rptr. 801, 805 (1983).
236. Id. at 447, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 805.
237. Id. In reaching its decision the court noted that the arbitration procedures out-
lined in the NYSE rules had been approved by the SEC. Id.
238. See Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 Harv. L. Rev.
1173, 1176 (1982). Professor Rakoff contends, in contrast to most current statements in
this area, that "the form terms present in contracts of adhesion ought to be considered
presumptively (although not absolutely) unenforceable." Id.
239. Cf. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 208, § 9-46, at 347 ("If the industries that
employ standard forms do not police themselves so as to insure inherent fairness of forms,
it is likely that the courts will increasingly refuse legal effect to non-negotiated terms of a
contract and that standardized forms, as in the case of insurance policies, will be dictated
by legislatures or administrative agencies."). In addition, if a court concludes that a cus-
tomer's agreement containing a pre-dispute arbitration clause is in fact a prerequisite for
general access to the securities markets, it could also conceivably take the extreme posi-
tion that the arbitration clause therein was per se unenforceable, because the agreement
was entered into without choice. Should that ultimately become the prevailing view, a
voluntary system wherein the execution of an arbitration agreement is not a prerequisite
to arbitration would still be practical and advisable. See supra note 124 (discussing volun-
tary procedures under the Commodity Exchange Act); cf. 7 U.S.C. §§ 7-26 (1982) (vol-
untary procedures under the Commodity Exchange Act).
240. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982). See supra notes 92-108 and accompanying text.
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tion agreements because of the doctrine of adhesion, 4' arbitration will
never be an accepted method for resolving securities disputes unless the
public perceives that arbitration procedures are fair in fact and appear-
ance. "[J]ustice should not only be done, but should manifestly and un-
doubtedly be seen to be done." 4 ' Although a fair arbitration code has
been prepared,243 it is only as good as its application. In this regard, the
selection of arbitrators is of crucial importance and is an area in which
vigilance must constantly be exercised. 24
The SICA Procedures Booklet provides that arbitrators are to be im-
partial persons who are knowledgeable in the areas in controversy. 245
Each sponsoring organization maintains a roster of individuals who are
not employees of the sponsoring organization but whose professional
qualifications and experience qualify them for service as arbitrators. 46
The Director of Arbitration of the SRO appoints the panel of arbitra-
tors, 24 7 sometimes by the "roll of the drum",2 48 and on other occasions
with an effort to match the problems of the case with the expertise of the
arbitrators. As a safeguard to public customers, the Uniform Code of
Arbitration clearly provides that unless the public customer requests
otherwise, the matter will be arbitrated by a panel "at least a majority of
whom shall not be from the securities industry. 2 49 No further guidance
is given by the Code as to who qualifies to be a "public arbitrator." Only
a slight clarification was provided by the original version of the Proce-
dures Booklet, which described public arbitrators as "individuals who
are neither associated with, nor employed by a broker-dealer or securities
industry organization. ' 250
The Code and Booklet left several questions unanswered. For example,
does the fact that someone was once associated with the securities indus-
try disqualify him as a public arbitrator? Similar questions arose con-
cerning the person who owns publicly traded stock of a brokerage house
or who services clients in the securities industry, such as an attorney or a
public accountant. Finally, would SICA disqualify an employee of a cor-
poration that is not in the securities business but that is either a parent or
subsidiary of a brokerage house?
241. See supra notes 207-39 and accompanying text.
242. Richards v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 64 Cal. App. 3d 899,
903, 135 Cal. Rptr. 26, 28 (1976) (quoting King v. Sussex Justices, (1924) 1 K.B. 256,
259). See infra notes 261-62 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 29-84 for a description of general procedures under the Uniform
Code of Arbitration.
244. See supra notes 233-37 and accompanying text.
245. See Procedures Booklet, supra note 23, at 3.
246. Id.
247. Uniform Code of Arbitration, supra, note 21, § 8(b).
248. The "roll of the drum" procedure is a random selection similar to choosing a
winner of a raffle.
249. Uniform Code of Arbitration, supra note 21, § 8(a)(1), (2). Such persons are
commonly referred to by SICA as Public Arbitrators.
250. Procedures Booklet, supra note 23, at 3.
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The definition of a public arbitrator has been repeatedly discussed
within SICA. Two conflicting equities had to be considered: On the one
hand was the desire to insure impartiality for the public customer, and
on the other hand was the desire to avoid making the definition so rigid
and narrow as to disqualify anyone who has ever dealt with the securities
industry, thereby stripping panels of valuable experience. Moreover, in
an era of financial supermarkets25'" it is possible to argue that employees
of businesses totally uninvolved in the securities field are associated-
through corporate or joint ownership-with a business that is a part of
the securities industry. Such rigidity would hamper efforts to provide an
effective and convenient forum with experienced and geographically di-
verse arbitrators. Accordingly, after much debate, SICA revised the Pro-
cedures Booklet by adding the following classification section:252
Guidelines for the Classification of Persons as Public Arbitrator:
No one may serve as a public arbitrator who has been an employee
or partner of a member organization or subsidiary thereof, or a share-
holder of a non-publicly owned member organization or subsidiary
thereof for a period of three years immediately preceding his or her
appointment as as public arbitrator.
Additional information concerning a particular arbitrator may be
obtained by a party or the party's attorney upon request directed to the
Director of Arbitration prior to the commencement of the hearing or a
submission to the arbitrator without a hearing. 253
Despite its general feeling that the selection of public arbitrators has been
professionally and ethically carried out,254 SICA included the provision
enabling a party to request additional information concerning a public
arbitrator in order to guard against any feeling of impropriety.255 For
this reason, while it appears that the proposed classification section is
workable, it must be applied with vigilance and good judgment by the
respective Directors of Arbitration of the various SROs.
If, for example, a person owned one million shares of Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. common stock, the Arbitration Director
should not designate him as a public arbitrator, even though he is not
disqualified by the revised classification section, and even if he were uni-
versally held to be exceptionally honorable and trustworthy. Similarly, if
an attorney has represented one securities broker, only and exclusively,
for the last twenty years, an Arbitration Director should not designate
251. An example of a financial supermarket is a holding company that owns securities,
banking, insurance, real estate and other related businesses.
252. Although the change is not being inserted directly into the Code itself, it is felt
that insertion in the Booklet will make it of binding effect on the SROs. Fourth Report,
supra note 7, at Exhibit B-Procedures Booklet.
253. Id.
254. Id. In light of this provision every effort should be made to keep records concern-
ing the affiliation and experience of public arbitrators updated and kept current to the
extent possible.
255. See supra notes 240-42 and accompanying text.
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such an attorney as a public arbitrator. In short, SICA has purposely
kept flexible the section governing classification of public arbitrators for
the good of both the public and the securities industry itself. Otherwise,
the vast experience of many needed and qualified persons would be lost.
The Directors of Arbitration, however, in the exercise of their discretion
must be vigilant to avoid suspicion on the part of the public.
CONCLUSION
It has been this author's experience that the securities arbitration pro-
cedures have, to date, resulted in an overall good faith effort to provide
fair resolution of public securities disputes. As the markets of the next
decade expand and become increasingly diverse and complex, however,
the controversies arising out of the handling of such transactions will
increase and become more difficult to resolve. Present arbitration proce-
dures-no matter how effective in the past-must be streamlined and
adjusted to meet that challenge.
To be effective and fair to all the parties, convenient security arbitra-
tion forums must be available throughout the country on a continuous
and permanent basis.256 This requires the provision of numerous hearing
locations and the availability of a large pool of widely dispersed, impar-
tial and experienced arbitrators-a tall order and one made even more
difficult if duplicated by differing SROs. Although adequate coverage is
currently provided through the efforts of SRO arbitration staffs, the situ-
ation will be complicated and strained by the explosion of arbitration
filings, present and anticipated.2 7 Accordingly, efforts should be made
to consolidate arbitration forums. Pools of experienced public arbitra-
tors should be combined and shared,258 and internal administrative pro-
cedures should be made uniform.
Ideally, securities arbitration should be moved from the SROs them-
selves to a totally independent organization 25 9 governed by members of
the public and the securities industry.26° If a separate forum is not pres-
256. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
258. Most SROs presently keep their own lists of arbitrators. See Procedures Booklet,
supra note 23, at 3.
259. An analogous concept has proved workable in the accounting field. In fact, since
1977, some of the trustees of the Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF) have been
selected by electors outside the accounting profession. See Financial Accounting Stan-
dards Board, Status Report No.68 at 2 (June 21, 1978). The FAF appoints, oversees and
finances the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), which is responsible for for-
mulating the rules by which companies account and report their financial condition. Id.
at 1-2; see Horngren, Introduction To Financial Accounting 57-58 (2d ed. 1984).
260. These public and industry representatives should have total responsibility for the
appointment of arbitrators and the government of the arbitration forums. Indeed, the
SEC has expressed its concern regarding possible public apprehension over the impartial-
ity of officials associated with SROs. See Investor Dispute System, supra note 17,
81,136, at 87,906. An independent forum will also help insulate an SRO from any
potential conflicts of interests that might arise from the fact that the SRO supplies the
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ently feasible, the SROs should consolidate their programs and then
amend their procedures to include direct and meaningful public partici-
pation in the administration thereof, for it is vitally important to the
health and stability of the securities markets that the public perceive ar-
bitration forums as independent.26
To insure .. public investment we must retain the public's confi-
dence-confidence in the markets themselves and confidence that
should a dispute arise, it will be fairly resolved. This confidence, how-
ever, can only be earned by maintaining a de facto as well as a dejure
image of fairness. In other words, the procedural rules must be fair
and the administration of the forum must be objective and independ-
ent; [moreover,] such administration should include public
representation.
262
Once meaningful public participation in the administrative process of
public securities arbitrations is achieved, the Wilko restraint can be abol-
ished,2 63 because Congress' interest in protecting the rights of securities
investors will be adequately served. 2" Removal of the Wilko restraint
would in turn do away with the inconvenience and waste caused by the
present problem of the intertwining of arbitrable and nonarbitrable dis-
putes.265 A specialized but independent arbitration forum would also
help alleviate the troublesome problem of adhesion by reducing the possi-
bility that a court would find bias on the part of the administering
arbitration forum. For example, does the arbitration department of an SRO have any
duty to reveal to the enforcement and disciplinary branch of that same SRO any impro-
prieties it discovers during the arbitration? To what extent is an SRO vulnerable to SEC
inquiry concerning the details of a particular arbitration proceeding specifically, or arbi-
tration proceedings generally?
It is doubtful whether an independent forum would increase the cost of arbitration. In
any case, such a rise in cost could easily be funded by a small mandatory surcharge
imposed upon each securities transaction. Moreover, the cost is negligible in view of the
alternatives-namely, distrust of arbitration, splitting of intertwined claims and extended
litigation in the courts. See supra notes 174-93 and accompanying text.
261. See supra section IV.
262. Statement of Constantine N. Katsoris before the Securities & Exchange Commis-
sion (Dec. 8, 1977) (available in files of Fordham Law Review).
263. Admittedly, abolishing Wilko will not be a total panacea in all cases. For exam-
ple, a party injured in the purchase of a new issue of securities might conceivably have a
claim under the 1933 Act against the issuer, the underwriter, his broker and the certifying
accountant. Requiring arbitration of his claim against his broker would necessitate his
pursuing a separate action against the others with whom he has no agreement to arbi-
trate. Such infrequent inconvenience, however, is, in the great majority of disputes be-
tween the securities industry and its customers, far outweighed by the removal of the
delays and uncertainties presently raised by Wilko. See supra notes 131-205 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of such problems. In addition, if Congress were to abolish
the Wilko exception for the "special right" created under § 12(2) of the 1933 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982), it might also consider providing the advantage of national service
on witnesses in the arbitration of federal securities claims. Just as Congress has the au-
thority to provide for a nation-wide service for federal claims, Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(e), it
appears that Congress could provide such a measure in the Arbitration Act.
264. See supra notes 100-08 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 182-206 and accompanying text.
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forum.
2 6 6
Finally, what is SICA's future role, if any? It could be allowed to die a
quiet death; or, having worked successfully once, it could be used as a
forum workshop for the resolution of future industry/public arbitration
disputes. In this role, it could act as the catalyst for the ultimate evolu-
tion of one national independent securities arbitration system that would
be both economical and free from even the most paranoid charge of
partiality.
266. See supra notes 221-34 and accompanying text.
